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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AS SHORT SELLERS?
PETER MOLK* & FRANK PARTNOY**
ABSTRACT
Short selling has the potential to improve the efficiency and fairness of equity
markets. Yet institutional investors face both private and regulatory constraints
to short selling. This Article documents these obstacles and considers the
potential benefits of removing them. We advocate that institutional investors
engage in more short selling as part of overall net-long equity strategies, such
as a leveraged passive equity index combined with an actively managed short
position of a size comparable to the amount of leverage.
* Associate Professor of Law at the University of Florida Levin College of Law.
Adrian A. Kragen Professor of Law at U.C. Berkeley School of Law.
Thanks to participants at the Institutional Investor Activism in the 2 1" Century: Responses
to a Changing Landscape symposium for excellent comments.
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INTRODUCTION
Short selling' accounts for roughly one quarter of all U.S. stock market
trading.2 Yet institutional investors are largely absent from this important part
of the market. 3 We ask why. We also explore how social welfare might be
improved if institutional investors become more involved in short selling.
Specifically, we suggest that institutions incorporate short selling into their
strategies, not necessarily by taking net-short positions, but instead by
combining leveraged long equity index positions with smaller actively managed
short portfolios. For example, an institution with $100 million under
management might buy $110 million of an equity index and also hold $10
million of short positions. To the extent institutions continue to engage directly
or indirectly in active management-a strategy we recognize is controversial-
we suggest that they consider shifting the active component of their strategy
away from exclusively long positions and instead in the direction of new short
positions. Rather than focusing exclusively on which stocks are likely to
outperform the market, they could also focus more on the stocks that will not.
The core of our argument is that institutional investors obtain negative
information about companies and markets, but that this information does not
become fully reflected in market prices. Our argument depends on two
assumptions, both of which we explore in detail. First, we assume that there are
a variety of reasons, both behavioral and regulatory, why different categories of
institutional investors do not engage in short selling even when it could be
financially beneficial for them to do so. Second, we assume that institutional
investor reluctance to engage in short selling impacts market prices. As
described below, various evidence and arguments support both of these
assumptions.
As an illustrative example, consider a manager of an actively traded mutual
fund who regularly obtains a range of information about different companies. It
is straightforward for the manager to create a new long position when she
receives positive information: she simply buys stock. Likewise, it would not be
unusual for the manager to sell an existing position based on negative
information. But if the manager goes one step further, and suggests selling short
a company's shares based on negative information, she will likely face greater
resistance. To the extent the fund manager is reluctant to sell short, some
In a typical short position, an investor (the "short seller") borrows shares she does not
yet own and sells those shares at current market prices; the short seller later "covers" the short
position by buying shares in the future and returning the borrowed shares. See Short Sales,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm [https://perma.cc/2L
J9-Q8LP] (last modified Apr. 13, 2015). The short seller thus bets that the share price will
decline between her initial sale and later purchase.
2 See Eric K. Kelly & Paul C. Tetlock, Retail Short Selling and Stock Prices, 30. REv. FIN.
STUD. 801, 806 n.5 (2017).
3 See infra Part I (discussing reasons why institutional investors are absent from short
selling market).
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negative information might become "bottled up" within the fund, and therefore
not reflected in market prices.4 This is the kind of scenario we explore.
There are some obvious reasons for institutional investors to avoid short
selling. First, it is costly.5 Short sellers must determine which companies to bet
against and then pay a loan fee to borrow shares to create and maintain their
short positions. They must post collateral, pay ongoing margin costs, and comply
with applicable regulatory requirements. Most fundamentally, to the extent the
stock market overall generates positive returns, short sellers on average can
expect, other things equal, to lose money.
Short selling is also risky.6 Unlike long positions, which can at most lose the
amount invested in the long position if the stock drops to $0, the potential loss
on a short position is infinite, growing as stock prices increase without bound.
Short sellers also risk margin calls, regulatory changes, potential increases in
loan fees, negative publicity, and legal actions against them when they take short
positions. 7 Finally, if shares are not available to borrow, a short seller might be
forced to close out a position early at a loss, even if that position was part of an
arbitrage strategy that ultimately would have been profitable.
In addition, short selling historically has faced a variety of cultural and
regulatory obstacles, which some scholars have labeled "indirect short-sale
constraints. ' 8 To the extent these constraints apply to institutional investors, they
can limit the ability of sophisticated investors to trade against the sentiment of
noise traders.9 When societal norms against short selling are pervasive and
salient, they can deter the managers of institutional investors from engaging in
the practice.
The costs and risks of short selling reduce market efficiency. They impose
limits to arbitrage that reduce liquidity, increase volatility, and skew the
4 We are grateful to Professor Eric Roiter, former general counsel of Fidelity, for
confirming our observation about fund managers' reluctance to sell short based on negative
information, in part because fund managers fear the repercussions of having to inform mutual
fund clients that they lost money in a rising market based on short positions. As we describe
below, a mutual fund that remained net 100% long (e.g., long 120%/short 20%) potentially
could avoid some of these problems.
5 See MANAGED FuNDs Ass'N, AN INTRODUCrION TO SHORT SELLING 7-12 (2018),
http://hedgefundamentals.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/An-Introduction-to-Short-
SellingWhite-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3XG-UKY] (describing costs arising from short
selling).
6 See id. at 14-15 (identifying risks posed by short selling).
7 See, e.g., Ian Appel, Jordan Bulka & Vyacheslav Fos, Public Short Selling by Activist
Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://cor
pgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/01/public-short-selling-by-activist-hedge-funds/ [https://perm
a.cc/I-IH57-BV8W] (noting that disclosure of short selling can result in regulatory scrutiny,
libel suits, and other costs).
' See Stefan Nagel, Short Sales, Institutional Investors and the Cross-Section of Stock
Returns, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 277, 278 (2005).
9 See id. at 277 (noting "[o]wnership by passive investors with large stock lending
programs partly mitigates" cross-sectional stock return anomalies).
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available information about individual companies, thereby leading to less
accurate stock prices.' 0 For decades, scholars have demonstrated that constraints
on short selling lead to mispricing and anomalies." Whereas managers have
sharp incentives to discover and disclose positive information, the same
incentives do not exist for negative information; the various constraints on short
selling, including costs and risks, discourage the private discovery and
disclosure of negative information. 12 More generally, when a portion of the
distribution of expectations about a company is limited, because of the various
constraints on short selling, stock prices are less likely to reflect the full array of
expectations and are therefore less likely to be informationally efficient. 13
Institutional investors have the potential to engage in short selling in a variety
of ways, but the relationship between short selling and institutional investors is
largely unexplored in the literature. 14 The dearth of scholarship about
10 See Joseph E. Engelberg, Adam V. Reed & Matthew C. Ringgenberg, Short-Selling
Risk, 73 J. FIN. 755, 756 (2018) (finding that stocks with more short-selling risk have lower
returns, less price efficiency, and less short selling); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
SHORT SALE POSITION AND TRANSACTION REPORTING 135 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/
files/short-sale-position-and-transaction-reporting%2C0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC2R-X55G]
("The academic literature provides ample theoretical support for, and empirical evidence of,
the importance of short selling for liquidity."); id. at 134 ("Theoretical studies support the
notion that short sellers promote price efficiency, finding that restrictions on short selling
should lead to less accurate prices, higher volatility, and should hinder price discovery.").
I See Ekkehart Boehmer & Juan (Julie) Wu, Short Selling and the Price Discovery
Process, 26 REv. FIN. STUr. 287, 317-18 (2012) ("We find that the total effect of shorting on
efficiency is lower when shorting is more constrained."); Karl B. Diether, Kuan-Hui Lee &
Ingrid M. Wemer, It's SHO Time! Short-Sale Price Tests and Market Quality, 64 J. FIN. 37,
38 (2009) ("[S]horting restrictions had no effect on the volatility of returns."); Owen A.
Lamont & Jeremy C. Stein, Aggregate Short Interest and Market Valuations, 94 AM. EcON.
REv. 29, 32 (2004) (arguing that problems arise in markets from too little short selling, not
too much).
12 See Joseph E. Engelberg, Adam V. Reed & Matthew C. Ringgenberg, How Are Shorts
Informed? Short Sellers, News, and Information Processing, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 260, 278
(2012) (arguing negative information is not accurately reflected in stock prices as informed
traders capitalize on superior information processing, not superior access to information).
13 See Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Constraints on Short-Selling and
Asset Price Adjustment to Private Information, 18 J. FIN. EcoN. 277, 302 (1987) (arguing
short sale constraints reduce the "rate at which private information is revealed to the public");
Harrison Hong & Jeremy Stein, Differences of Opinion, Short-Sales Constraints, and Market
Crashes, 16 REv. FIN. STUD. 487, 491 (2003) (arguing some investors do not trade due to
constraints on short selling, preventing accurate information from being revealed to markets);
Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1166
(1977) ("In a market with little or no short selling the demand for a particular security will
come from the minority who hold the most optimistic expectations about it.").
14 See Nagel, supra note 8, at 281-82 (exploring impact of institutional investor ownership
of shares on short selling constraints and returns, but not addressing extent of institutional
investor short selling or its impact); Melissa Porras Prado, Pedro A. C. Saffi & Jason Sturgess,
Ownership Structure, Limits to Arbitrage, and Stock Returns: Evidence from Equity Lending
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institutional investors and short selling is surprising given how many other
topics related to institutional investors have been covered.1 5 Among the topics
scholars have examined regarding how institutional investors impact the markets
are: how hedge funds engage in activist campaigns to achieve corporate
reform, 16 how public pension funds divest from certain investments to great
public attention,17 and how sovereign wealth funds attract attention with
investments in private and public technology companies. 18 Yet institutional
investor short selling remains an understudied topic.
This Article seeks to understand the relationship between institutional
investors and short selling. We ask why institutional investors avoid significant
amounts of short selling, and we explore whether and how private and regulatory
policy might change to embrace short selling by institutional investors. Part I
reviews the reasons for the current dearth of institutional investor short selling.
Markets, 29 REV. FIN. STuD. 3211 (2016) (undertaking first study of impact of institutional
ownership on short selling).
15 Short selling has historically been a topic of interest to legal scholars, although the focus
has been on issues other than institutional investor participation, such as legal rules restricting
shorting generally. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Mark Mitchell & Jeffry Netter, Restrictions
on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and Its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock
Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 835 (1989) (discussing uptick rule which restricts
short selling); see also James W. Christian, Robert Shapiro & John-Paul Whalen, Naked Short
Selling: How Exposed Are Investors?, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1033, 1041-44 (2006) (explaining
naked short selling and how it differs from traditional short sales); Erik R. Sirri, Regulatory
Politics and Short Selling, 71 U. PITr. L. REV. 517, 536-38 (2010) (discussing effect of politics
on Securities and Exchange Commission's regulation of short selling); David C. Worley, The
Regulation of Short Sales: The Long and the Short of It, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1255, 1298-99
(1990) (chronicling how short sales are regulated). Some recent interest arose from the use of
short selling by hedge funds seeking to invalidate patents. See Feng Ye, Note, Trading on the
Outcomes of Patent Challenges: Short-Selling Petitioners and Possible Modifications to the
Inter Partes Review Process, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 557, 558-61 (2016)
(highlighting interplay between trading and the patent process).
16 See ACTIVIST INSIGHT, THE ACTIVIST INVESTING ANNUAL REvIEw 2018, at 6 (2018),
https://www.srz.com/images/content/l/5/v2/155375/The-Activist-Investing-Annual-
Review-2018-HiRes.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3VD-N3HS] (summarizing recent activist
campaigns); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1100 (2015) (finding significant growth in hedge
fund activism campaigns from 1994 through 2007). Scholars also have begun exploring the
extent of short selling by hedge fund activists. See Appel, supra note 7, at 26 (highlighting
emergence of short selling by activist hedge funds).
17 See, e.g., CAL. PuB. EMPS.' RET. SYS., PUBLIC DIVESTITURE OF THERMAL COAL
COMPANIES ACT 3 (2017), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/public-divesti
ture-coal-companies-act-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ5H-6Y3L] (discussing CalPERS's
divestment from certain coal companies).
18 Maureen Farrell, Larger Tesla Stake by Giant Saudi Fund Faces Hurdles, WALL STREET
J. (Aug. 14, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/larger-tesla-stake-by-giant-saudi-
fund-faces-hurdles-1534239000 (discussing prospect of Tesla founder and CEO Elon Musk
taking Tesla private with help of Saudi Arabia's sovereign wealth fund).
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We identify the regulatory and other barriers that keep key categories of
institutions from acquiring significant short positions.
Part II then considers the policy implications that flow from institutional
investors' inability and reluctance to take short positions. We show several
benefits that likely would result from a system of robust institutional shorting.
Institutional shorting could improve capital market efficiency by increasing
incentives for negative information to be reflected in securities prices. Shorting
also could strengthen discipline of corporate management and better inform
directors, thus enhancing economic efficiency.
In addition, institutional shorting could apply pressure to rationalize the
problems that continue to plague share lending,1 9 while also improving policy
outcomes related to voting, dividend taxation, and bankruptcy. Finally,
increased institutional shorting could enhance institutions' ability to pursue
social goals on behalf of their investors by increasing the financial rewards from
furthering these goals.
Although a system of increased institutional shorting could result in
significant benefits, it would also introduce new costs and risks that deserve
careful consideration before revamping regulatory policy. Accordingly, Part III
recommends a measured approach. It shows how institutional investors could
become more involved in short selling both directly and indirectly while still
complying with current regulatory restrictions. Such modest approaches could
generate many benefits without significant risks, and thereby offer an
opportunity to test the effects of increased institutional short selling before
implementing more sweeping regulatory changes.
Specifically, we explore in Part III how institutional investors could shift their
equity-related strategies to strategies that maintain diversified exposure to equity
markets by implementing the long/short strategy favored by many hedge funds
(either directly within their own portfolios or indirectly with outside
managers).20 The notion of combining a slightly leveraged long position with a
short position of a size that is comparable to the amount of leverage is not novel.
Dozens of mutual funds already follow such strategies, although they generally
do not involve the major fund families.2 ' Kynikos Capital, a prominent hedge
fund, is 190% long and 90% short, with a primarily passive long position but
19 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1227, 1230-31 (2008) (highlighting problems with current shareholder voting system);
Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 780, 813 (same).
20 See William Fung & David A. Hsieh, The Risk in Hedge Fund Strategies: Theory and
Evidence from Long/Short Equity Hedge Funds, 18 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 547, 547 (2011) (finding
that 40% of hedge funds employed some type of long-short strategy).
21 See Long-Short Equity: Total Returns, MORNINGSTAR, http://news.momingstar.com/fun
d-category-returns/long-short-equity/$FOCA$LO/print.aspx [https://perma.cc/4WCC-Y434]
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (displaying returns on several firms' long-short funds). PIMCO is
an example of a fund family that has funds employing long-short strategies.
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significant focus on its short positions.22 Still, long-short strategies are far from
mainstream, and appear to be rare among other types of institutional investors.
We recognize that, at some point, the amount of shorting by institutions might
become too large, creating downward informational biases in place of positive
ones, but the literature suggests that the markets are far from that crossover
point.
We do not view short selling as a mainstream investment strategy for all
institutional investors; we recognize that not all investors can or wish to have
direct involvement. We therefore also explore how institutional investors could
engage in short selling indirectly. They could improve markets overall, and their
own returns, by tolerating a greater amount of short selling among the external
managers they entrust with institutional funds.
In advocating that institutional investors embrace short selling, this Article
suggests that short selling might be viewed in the same way public law scholars
view some free speech actors: outlier participants in society who do not represent
the views of the majority and who seek changes that would harm certain
powerful institutions and individuals, but whose efforts and positions
nevertheless can effect changes that significantly benefit society overall.
I. WHY DON'T INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS SHORT?
We begin by reviewing reasons why institutional investors do not engage
significantly in short selling. First, a word on terminology. By "institutional
investors," we refer to significant entities that hold and invest funds ultimately
owned by others. 23 Categories of institutional investors include mutual funds,
insurance companies, pension funds, banks, sovereign wealth funds,
endowments, foundations, and hedge funds. Of these categories, only a subset
of hedge funds has engaged in short selling to a significant degree.
22 See Michelle Celarier, How Jim Chanos Uses Cynicism, Chutzpah - and a Secret Twitter
Account - to Take on Markets (and Elon Musk), INSTITtJONAL INVESTOR (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/blb00ynrgtn05r/How-Jim-Chanos-Uses-
Cynicism-Chutzpah-and-a-Secret-Twitter-Account-to-Take-on-Markets-and-Elon-Musk
[https://perma.cc/7W22-GVVV].
23 See, e.g., Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of
Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262,280 n.68 (2016) (contrasting institutional investors with
"retail, mom-and-pop investors"); Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal
Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2029 (2018) (using "institutional
investors" to mean any "entit[y] that manage[s] stock market investing on behalf of final
owners"); Form 13F-Reports Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, U.S. SEC. & ExCH.
COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-forml3fhtm.html [https://perma.cc/TL
R5-2LAH] (last modified Feb. 9, 2019) (defining institutional investors as "(1) an entity that
invests in, or buys and sells, securities for its own account; or (2) a natural person or an entity
that exercises investment discretion over the account of any other natural person or entity").
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Institutional investors represent an enormous amount of economic activity.
For example, mutual funds manage approximately $27 trillion.24 Pension funds
control approximately $20 trillion in assets, according to the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development, with insurance companies adding
another $9 trillion.25 Sovereign wealth funds invest roughly $10-s15 trillion on
a global basis.26 Hedge fund assets are estimated at $3 trillion.27 Another $1
trillion or so comes from endowments and foundations.2 8 Collectively, these
holdings comprise well over half the value of the U.S. stock market.
29
Institutional investors' rise to prominence in the capital markets is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Hedge funds, for example, were small players leading into
the 1990s; their assets under management grew by a milltiple of six between
2000 and today.30 Mutual funds' assets under management increased thirty-five
times between the late 1980s and today, largely driven by the rise in index funds
and exchange-traded funds.3 1 The percentage of the overall U.S. stock market
24 INV. CO. INST., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO MEMBERS 2(2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/17
_ici annual.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TSC-4TUD] (finding investment company assets total
$26.7 trillion).
25 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS STATISTICS
2009-2016, at 170 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/fmance-and-investment/oecd-institut
ional-investors-statistics-2017_instinv-2017-en#page1 [https://perma.ec/BA2F-V2ZH]
(detailing assets held by pension funds and insurance companies).
26 STEFANO CURTO, THE WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC PREMISE: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FuNDs
IN THE NEXT DECADE 1 (Apr. 2010), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/8864514683
41078325/pdf/539150BRIOEP8OBox345633B0 IPUBLIC L.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6MR-DT
Z2] (citing reports that estimated sovereign wealth fund assets at $13.4 trillion to $17.5
trillion); Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST., https://www.sw
fmstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/BP5Y-A8RR] (last visited
Apr. 16, 2019) (estimating $8 trillion in assets).
27 Melissa Karsh, Hedge Fund Assets Pass $3 Trillion in 2016 for First Time: Chart,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-
23/hedge-fund-assets-pass-3-trillion-in-2016-for-first-time-chart.
28 Keith C. Brown, Lorenzo Garlappi & Christian Tiu, The Troves of Academe: Asset
Allocation, Risk Budgeting and the Investment Performance of University Endowment Funds
1 (McCombs Research Paper Series No. FIN-03-07, 2007), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/pap
ers.cfm?abstractid--981436 (estimating endowment and foundations controlled $1.3 trillion
in 2005). College and university endowments alone comprise over $500 million. Fast Facts,
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=73 [https://perma.c
c/8B6A-LQT9] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
29 See, e.g., Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not
Supreme, 5 HARv. Bus. L. REV. 73, 79 (2015) ("[I]nstitutional investors own, on average,
more than 50% of all public firms in the U.S."); Morton & Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at
2029 ("Institutional investors today own roughly 70% of the U.S. stock market.").
30 Registration Under the Advisors Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,064 (Dec. 10, 2004) (quoting study that estimated hedge fund assets under
management at $450 billion in 1999).
31 INV. CO. INST., 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, atx (2010), https://www.ici.org
/pdf/2010_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TF3-BPB6] (listing $769 billion in assets under
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held by institutional investors overall has similarly increased, from
approximately 5% in 1945, to 34% in 1980, to 67% in 2010.32
With institutional investors' rise has come a dramatic increase in their power.
Although institutional investors control assets ultimately owned by a diffuse and
diverse ownership base, each institutional investor typically votes its shares in a
single block, on behalf of a hypothetical individual owner.33 This approach to
voting, combined with large holdings, gives institutional investors tremendous
clout.34 Institutional investors regularly voice their concerns-and exert
influence-over matters ranging from composition of boards of directors to say
on pay and social responsibility. 35
Short selling is notably absent from most institutional investors' repertoire.
The reasons for this absence are varied, and we consider them below. Before
doing so, we reiterate that a significant subset of one category of institutional
investors-hedge funds--does engage in regular shorting activity. We develop
the reasons for, and ramifications of, this important swath of institutional
behavior in detail in a separate article. 36 We now turn to considering specific
categories of institutional investors and their lack of appetite for shorting.
management in 1987); INV. CO. INST., supra note 24, at 2 (listing $27 trillion in assets under
management today).
32 Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Institutional Investors and Stock Market
Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 4-5 (Sept. 18, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2147757 (examining trends in stock ownership).
33 See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trusiees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1021, 1066-67 (1996) (stating that "key
point about insitutional investors is that they invest on behalf of the interest of their own
fictional corporate law shareholders").
34 This is particularly true when institutional investors' interests align on a particular issue.
See, e.g., Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the
Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New
Financial Risk, 19 Bus. & POL. 298, 316-19 (2017) (analyzing coordination among
BlackRock, Fidelity, and Vanguard passive funds).
35 See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., U.S. POLICY - DIRECTOR ELECTIONS -
BOARD GENDER DIvERSITY, https://www.issgovemance.com/file/policy/2018/DirectorElecti
ons-BoardGenderDiversity-US.pdf [https://perma.cc/T77R-G443] (last visited Apr. 16,
2019) (proposing comments for advising institutional investors on board of directors gender
composition); Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual
Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 l-ARv. Bus. L. REv. 35, 36-38 (2013) (examining mutual
funds role in management elections); J. Alexander Dyck et al., Do Institutional Investors
Drive Corporate Social Responsibility? International Evidence, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming
2019) (manuscript at 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=2708589
(examining institutional investors role in social responsibility); Paul H. Edelman et al.,
Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REv. 1359, 1426-33
(2014) (analyzing institutional voting on say on pay provisions). See generally Luca Enriques
& Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A Network Theory
Perspective, 2019 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming) (analyzing how and why institutional
investors invest in voting despite financial incentives to the contrary).
36 See Barbara A. Bliss, Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Negative Activism, 99 WASH. U. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssm.com/abstract-3341567.
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A. Mutual Funds
The reasons for mutual funds' lack of short selling are predominantly historic
and regulatory. Modem regulation continues to restrict, but not eliminate,
mutual funds' ability to take short positions. Although some historic regulatory
barriers have been removed, mutual funds have been slow to increase their short
selling given previous restrictions.
Historically, tax policy has been one of the main impediments to mutual fund
short selling. Until 1997, the "short-short" rule caused mutual funds to lose
favorable pass-through tax treatment if more than 30% of their capital gains
came from short-term investments. 37 Under this rule, just under one third of
mutual funds' gains could come from short selling38 or other short term
investments, unless mutual funds were willing to forfeit a significant
competitive tax advantage.
Although the "short-short" rule is no longer in effect, the tax treatment of
mutual fund short selling remains unfavorable. All gains from short positions
are taxed at relatively high short-term capital gains rates.39 Funds that strive for
tax efficiency are thus dissuaded from short selling. Moreover, the expected pre-
tax gains on short positions must be comparatively greater than those of long-
term long positions, which have the potential for lower long-term capital gains
tax rates.
In addition to tax, another regulatory obstacle to short selling is the
Investment Company Act of 1940's restriction on mutual fund leverage. 40 Since
shorting involves borrowing shares the shorter does not own, it falls within the
Act's requirement that shorters hold 300% of the shorted amount in a separate
account, to act as security against losses.4 1 The restriction gives rise to the
commonly held wisdom that mutual funds cannot short more than a quarter of
their market value.42 In reality, the restriction is far more modest. The Securities
37 See, e.g., Bill Barnhart, Short-Sort Rule Repeal: The Long and the Short Of It, Cm.
TIm., Aug. 17, 1997, at C3.
38 The tax treatment of short sale gains is short-term income regardless of the length of
time that the mutual fund held the position, unless the mutual fund also held the underlying
shorted shares for a significant length of time. Publication 550 (2017), Investment Income
and Expenses, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/publications/p550 [https://perma.cc/7G8F-J5UJL]
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019) ("As a general rule, you determine whether you have short-term
or long-term capital gain or loss on a short sale by the amount of time you actually hold the
property eventually delivered to the lender to close the short sale.").
3 See supra note 38.
0 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2012).
41 Id. § 80a-2 (prohibiting registered investment companies from shorting); id. § 80a-18
(rules for open-end funds); id. § 80b-2 (close-end funds).
42 See, e.g., INV. Co. INST., CoNREHENsivE REGULATORY REGIME FOR U.S. MUTUAL
FUNDS, https://www.ici.org/pdf/14 ici usfundsjregulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCW8-
MY4A] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (noting that the Act "strictly limit[s] mutual funds' ability
to take on leverage" and pointing to the requirement of"asset coverage of at least 300 percent
for all [shorting]").
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and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has indicated that the Act's 300% coverage
requirement will be satisfied as long as mutual funds hold, in a separate account,
liquid securities or other high-quality assets equal to the market value of any
shorted shares, amounting to only an effective 100% coverage requirement.
43
Moreover, mutual fund investments in leveraged assets (as contrasted with
mutual funds leveraging investments themselves) do not fall within the Act's
restrictions; investing in various derivative investments have therefore allowed
mutual funds to achieve leverage reportedly up to ten to one ratios while still
complying with the Act's requirements. 44 Therefore, as with tax policy changes,
modem formal regulatory constraints impose few obstacles to mutual fund
shorting.
Mutual funds also avoid short selling for non-regulatory reasons, including as
a response to real and perceived principal-agent costs.45 Some have argued that
mutual fund managers' compensation arrangements can push them to undertake
excessively risky investments relative to the level of risk desired by the
underlying owners.46 Funds undertake a variety of responses to this problem,
one of which is to impose blanket limitations through their governance
documents, which restrict managers' authority to engage in certain potentially
risky types of transactions. 47 Since shorting securities without holding the
underlying asset (or an asset highly correlated with the underlying asset)
41 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (prohibiting registered investment companies from shorting); id.
§ 80a-18 (allowing investment companies to use leverage, including shorting, if certain
requirements are satisfied); Merrill Lynch Asset Management, SEC No-Action Letter, File
No. 801-11583 (July 2, 1996) (stating that "issue of compliance with Section 18 would not be
raised if a fund covers its obligations.., by maintaining a segregated account on the
books... containing assets equal in value to those obligations"). These are rules for open-
end mutual funds---rules for close-end funds are similar. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2 (imposing
nominal coverage requirements of 200% to 300%, depending on the nature of the senior
security).
I See, e.g., Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm., Speech at the Brookings
Institute in Washington D.C.: Mutual Funds - The Next 75 Years (June 15, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/mutual-funds-the-next-75-years-stein.html
[https://perma.cc/9N1{M-XKQ4] (recounting reports of funds achieving effective lx
leverage through using swaps and futures contracts).
45 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Why Excessive Risk-Taking Is Not Unexpected, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Oct. 5, 2009, 1:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/dealbook-
dialogue-leo-strine/ (using phrase "separation of 'ownership from ownership"' to describe
institutional investor conflicts).
46 See, e.g., Andres Almazan et al., Why Constrain Your Mutual Fund Manager?, 73 J.
FIN. ECON. 289, 300 (2004) (discussing how compensation arrangements may influence risk-
taking behavior). Such excessive risk-taking is particularly exacerbated when managers'
compensation packages partially or fully insulate them from fund underperformance. This
will be true for a variety of management payment structures. See generally id. (summarizing
research related to tailoring management compensation contracts to align manager and
investor incentives and mitigate this risky portfolio problem).
47 See id. at 295-97 (studying funds' adoption of six investment constraints as means of
aligning manager and investor incentives).
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represents a risk-enhancing leveraged transaction with potentially limitless
losses, many funds have adopted shorting constraints.48As with regulatory and historic reasons, though, this kind of internal
constraint has also apparently moderated over time. In 1994, 73% of funds filing
SEC Form N-SAR (a form that registered investment companies must file semi-
annually) had adopted internal policies restricting short sales. 49 Today, the ratio
has flipped, with the majority of funds (64%) permitting short sales, perhaps in
response to more tightly aligning manager-investor incentives in other ways.50
Regulatory and private ordering constraints on mutual fund short selling have
therefore markedly diminished. Despite the ability to engage in shorting, though,
mutual funds' actual use of short selling still remains surprisingly low. In 2014,
for example, only 5.25% of funds engaged in short selling of any sort, despite
64% of funds' governance documents authorizing short sales.5 1 The positions
were also often relatively modest, ranging from 8% to a maximum of 20% of
those funds' net asset value.52
Accordingly, mutual funds' current lack of short selling presents something
of a puzzle. There are currently few formal barriers to short selling by mutual
funds, and some evidence suggests that short selling generates significant
abnormal returns for those mutual funds that engage in it.53 Yet the amount of
short selling by mutual funds remains relatively low.
B. Insurance Companies
The story of insurance companies and short selling is straightforward: state
law regulating insurer solvency generally prohibits insurance companies from
engaging in short selling. This state law prohibition arises from the model
regulation promulgated by the influential National Association of Insurance
Commissioners ("NAIC"), which prohibits short sales by an insurance company
unless it owns the underlying security or the unrestricted right to buy that
4 Id. at 295 (noting that nearly 70% of funds constrain short selling over seven year sample
period).
49 Id. (noting "73.3% of the 679 funds" formally restricted short selling). To the extent that
all short sales are restricted, however, these constraints may be overly broad, as they rule out
risk-reducing covered shorting.
50 DANIEL DELI ET AL., Div. OF ECON. & RISK ANALYSIS, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, USE OF
DERIVATIVES BY REGISTERED INvESTmENT COMPANIEs 22 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/files/
derivatives 12-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M7T-WVD6] (detailing investment practices in
which funds are permitted to, and actually, engage).
5' Id. (showing disparity between funds permitted to short and funds actually shorting).
Early studies found that even fewer mutual funds were short sellers, in the range of 3%,
suggesting a modest increase in recent years. See Almazan et al., supra note 46, at 300.
52 DELI ET AL., supra note 50, at 12. Short positions average approximately 16% of fund
assets among funds that choose to short.
53 Engelberg, Reed & Ringgenberg, supra note 10, at 762-65 (finding funds that short earn
abnormal returns of 1.6% per year relative to their benchmarks, and 4.1% per year based on
their short positions).
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security within six months. 54 For a variety of reasons, individual states generally
follow the NAIC prohibition.55
The NAIC prohibition is part of a conservative regulatory regime that
emphasizes the safety of investments and is focused on ensuring insurance
company solvency. This regulatory regime has been criticized in the fixed
income setting for its undue reliance on credit ratings, and for indirectly (and
perhaps inadvertently) permitting the use of fixed instruments such as structured
notes to invest indirectly in equities. 56 Yet notwithstanding NAIC difficulties in
the fixed income markets, the NAIC regulations generally have strictly limited
the amounts that insurance companies can invest directly in equities, and by
extension their ability to short. For example, the NAIC model solvency rules
limit equity investment to 20% of a life insurer's assets and 25% of insurer assets
in other lines;57 states generally follow suit.5 8
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, it became apparent that some
insurance companies, particularly AIG, had been using derivatives for various
purposes. However, a recent NAIC study shows that insurance companies use
derivatives only to a very limited extent, primarily to hedge risk rather than to
obtain synthetic short equity exposure.59 Indeed, as of 2017, it appeared that only
5% of all active insurance companies had any derivatives exposure at all,60 and
this exposure overwhelmingly was used to hedge investments (94% of
derivative exposure was devoted to hedging, with income generation use well
under 1%).61
In sum, insurance companies generally are not active short sellers. Short
selling by insurance companies is used almost exclusively to hedge positions,
and generally is not used with respect to equity positions at all.
54 INVESTMENTS OF INSURERS MODEL AcT § § 13(D), 26(D) (NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS
2015).
55 See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 1410(a)(2), (d) (McKinney 2019) (allowing insurance
companies to engage in hedging, or income generation only if the insurer writes certain call
options-the opposite position of a short). See generally Daniel Schwarcz, Is U.S. Insurance
Regulation Unconstitutional?, 25 U. CONN. INS. L. REv. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssr
n.com/sol3/papers.cfhi?abstractid=3239966 (analyzing persuasive power of NAIC solvency
regulation standards).
56 See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUs GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2009).
57 INVESTMENTS OF INSURERS MODEL ACT § § 13(B), 26(B) (NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS
2015).
11 See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital
Markets, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 245, 274 (2009) (reporting life insurer equity caps
of 25% in Texas, 20% in Illinois, and 20% in New York).
59 Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs & Ctr. for Ins. Policy & Research, Capital Markets Special
Report: Update on the Insurance Industry's Use of Derivatives and Exposure Trends, NAIC,
https://www.naic.org/capitalmarkets-archive/170323.htm [https://perma.cc/8R9B-A9XJ]
(last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
60 Id. tbl. 1.
61 Id. tbl.7.
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C. Pension Plans
The extent to which pension funds engage in short selling is unclear. Although
there are some regulatory and private restrictions on pension fund short selling,
these restrictions are relatively modest. Pension plans are generally divided into
public plans (affiliated with government employers and employees) and private
plans (for private employers and employees), with regulations differing
accordingly. Pension funds also are divided between defined contribution and
defined benefit plans, with the latter diminishing in importance over time, but
still constituting a significant area of institutional investing.
Historically, defined benefit public pension plans (with the exception of
federal public pension plans, which constitute a relatively small portion of all
public pension plans) 62 have faced state law restrictions on their investment
activities. These restrictions were designed to limit pension plans' risk of loss
and were quite burdensome, effectively pushing pension plans into fixed income
investments and cash.63 In 1952, for example, 96% of public pension plan assets
were invested in fixed income investments and cash. 64 States began to liberalize
their approaches beginning in the 1980s, giving pension plans the flexibility to
pursue other investment types. By 2012, assets in fixed income investments and
cash had decreased to a still-sizable 27%, with countervailing increases in other
investment types.65
Today, some states' public pension plan regulations allow pension funds wide
latitude in their investment choices, subject to various prudent investor
standards. California, for example, gives its public pension funds the discretion
to invest in any asset, whatsoever, directing them merely to "diversify the
investments.., to minimize the risk of loss and to maximize the rate of return"
subject to duties of care, skill, prudence, and diligence of a prudent investor. 66
These charges seemingly allow for short selling. Other states like Georgia
prohibit their pension plans from significant investments in "alternative
investments," such as commodities, low-grade debt, or hedge funds. 67
62 See, e.g., Palmiter, supra note 58, at 266.
63 See, e.g., PEw CHARITABLE TRS., STATE PUBLIC PENSION INVESTMENTS SHIFT OVER PAST
30 YEARS 2 (2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2014/06/state-publicpension i
nvestmentsshiftover_past_30_years.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VXN-GULY].
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 17(c), (d).
67 Until 2012, Georgia public pensions were prohibited from investing any assets in these
alternative investments; today its public pensions can invest up to 5% of assets in these
investments. See, e.g., Public Retirement Systems Investment Authority Law, GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-20-80 to 47-20-87 (2018); Russell Grantham, Change in Georgia's Pension Law Not
Raising Capital Like Intended, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Dec. 30, 2012), https://www.ajc.com/
news/change-georgia-pension-law-not-raising-capital-like-intended/OM9a7UJLFpcX1 dCP 1
OqGN8K/ [https://perma.cc/G48F-HX65]. Georgia's largest pension plan was excluded from
this law, keeping it unable to invest in these alternative investments.
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Public pension plans have shown an appetite for nontraditional investment
types, including shorting, when they have been allowed to do so. Approximately
25% of public pension plan assets are invested in alternative investments such
as private equity, hedge funds, real estate, and commodities, apparently driven
by these plans' attempts to cover future funding commitments. 68 But it is unclear
how much, if any, of this allocation is involved in short selling specifically.69
Unlike public pension plans, defined benefit private pension plans are
regulated under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") regime. These regulations do not on their face prohibit short selling.
Plan managers are required to invest with the care and skill of a prudent
investor.70 This standard implicates similar standards under private trusts,
summarized in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act ("UPIA") and the Third
Restatement of Trusts.71 The UPIA, adopted in forty-four states, 72 does not
expressly prohibit the use of shorts or any other type of investment. Indeed, it
notes that "[a]ll categoric restrictions on types of investment have been
abrogated" 73 and that "[a] trustee may invest in any kind of property or type of
investment consistent with the standards" of the Act.74 Similarly, the Third
Restatement of Trusts contemplates that trustees may seek "higher risk in quest
of greater return" and notes that no single type of investment is categorically
impermissible. 75 Nor does caselaw appear to provide a clear deterrent, absent a
provision in the plan documents prohibiting such an investment.76
Yet despite this apparently permissive standard, private pension plans invest
little outside of traditional investments. A sample drawn from Fortune 1000
companies shows a relatively steady 15% of fund assets invested outside of
68 PEw CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 63, at 7.
69 Once private equity and real estate are removed, a study of the largest sixteen public
pension plans showed investment of only 5% of their assets in "other" types of alternative
investments, which seemingly includes any short investments. ELLIOT HENTOW, ALEXANDER
PETROV & SEJAL ODEDRA, STATE ST. GLOB. ADvIsoRs, How Do PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS
INVEST? 5 (2018), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/asset-allocation/2018/inst-how-
do-ppfs-invest.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y99-LZAR].
70 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1191c, 1201-1242, 1302-1461 (2012).
71 UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT (AM. BAR ASS'N 1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
(AM. LAW INST. 2003); see, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-
11 (1989) ("ERISA's legislative history confirms that [ERISA's] fiduciary responsibility
provisions codifly] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed
in the evolution of the law of trusts.").
72 Prudent Investor Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committ
ees/community-home?communitykey=58f87d0a-3617.-4635-a2af-9a4d02dl 19c9&tab=grou
pdetails [https://perma.cc/SZN6-UYSB] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
73 UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT prefatory note at 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1995).
74 Id. § 2(e).
75 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 227 cmt. f(2), 228 cmt. e (1992).
76 See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, Derivatives and the Modern Prudent
Investor Rule: Too Risky or Too Necessary?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 525, 536-45 (2006)
(summarizing caselaw and commentary on trustee use of derivatives).
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standard classes of cash, debt, or equity from 2009 through 2016. 77 Only 6-8%
of assets were invested in hedge funds and "other" assets that could conceivably
involve short selling activity; the remainder was invested in private equity and
real estate. 78
Notwithstanding these limitations, private pension plans do appear to have an
appetite for using derivatives, some portion of which might be devoted to
shorting or its equivalent. In a survey of pension fund chief investment officers,
only 22% of respondents indicated they had no plans to use derivatives. 79
Seventy-one percent said they currently use derivatives, with another 7%
planning to do so. 80 This appetite for using derivatives suggests that some
pension funds might be open to increased short selling of equities, although it
seems doubtful that chief investment officers would use short selling as a free-
standing investment strategy, given its risk.
Pension funds have exhibited herding behavior in various ways, moving in
and out of different asset classes in groups.8 1 To the extent they systemically
switch among classes of investment, they might exhibit similar herding behavior
with respect to short selling. The fact that pension funds generally are not short
sellers today does not mean they will not become short sellers tomorrow.
D. Banks
Like insurance companies and pension funds, banks do not engage in
significant amounts of equity short selling. Indeed, federally insured banks
cannot invest their general assets in stocks, in either long or short positions.82
They can, however, invest assets for which they act as trustees in securities,
allowing for some equity involvement. As with pension plans, bank trustees are
7 Mercedes Aguirre & Brendan McFarland, Willis Towers Watson, 2016 Asset
Allocations in Fortune 1000 Pension Plans, INSIDER, Jan. 2018,. at 1, 7, https://www.towers
watson.com/en/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/Insider/2018/01/2016-asset-allocations-in-
fortune-i 000-pension-plans [https://perma.cc/9UPC-9KXK] (finding stable percentage
investment outside of cash, debt, and equity for Fortune 1000 companies).
78 Id. (showing hedge fund and other investment between 6.5% and 8.3% from 2009 to
2016).
79 2016 Liability Driven Investment Survey, CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER (Nov. 16, 2016,
11:02 PM), https://www.ai-cio.com/surveys/2016-liability-driven-investment-survey.
80 Id.
8' See David Blake, Lucio Sarno & Gabriele Zinna, The Market for Lemmings: The
Herding Behavior of Pension Funds (Pensions Inst., Discussion Paper No. PI-1408, 2016),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2567381 ("[P]ension funds do indeed
behave like lemmings as they herd strongly both in asset classes and in clearly defined
subgroups.").
82 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (limiting class of securities federally insured banks may invest
in); 12 C.F.R. § 362.3 (2018) (prohibiting class of equity investments for insured state banks,
including long and short positions); id. § 362.11 (prohibiting class of equity investments for
insured state savings associations, including long and short positions).
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not expressly prohibited from shorting as trustees as a matter of course and
instead are subject to prudent investor standards. 83
As with private pension plans, bank trust administrators face no clear mandate
against shorting. 84 Trust administrators, however, have a history of adopting
conservative investment strategies. Although shorting can be used to reduce risk
when matched with similar long positions, using short selling as an income-
generation tool is not consistent with the overall conservative investment
tradition.
Outside of their trustee roles, banks, whether insured or not, also face new
liquidity coverage rules that require banks to hold liquid assets at least equal to
their projected net cash outflows over a thirty-day period.85 Only "high-quality
liquid assets"--basically Treasury notes and cash-count towards liquid
assets.86 Banks are therefore further restricted from shorting: only the amount
that exceeds this threshold could conceivably be invested in short positions.
Historically, investment banks have used short selling as part of various
underwriting strategies, including stabilization efforts related to initial public
offerings. However, that activity is limited to particular events. Investment bank
proprietary trading likely involved short selling, but that category of trading has
declined since the financial crisis. Although bank affiliates might invest more
broadly, overall banks themselves invest very little of their portfolios in long
equities positions, and generally are not involved in the short selling of equities
for their own portfolios. 87 Significant regulatory and cultural changes would be
required to alter this practice.
E. Sovereign Wealth Funds
Sovereign wealth funds are estimated to have roughly fifteen trillion dollars
in institutional investment.88 Because of their private nature, it is difficult to get
an accurate sense for how these funds invest. Despite this difficulty, some
anecdotal data are available.
Some experts claim that most sovereign wealth funds are 'generally passive
and long-term investors with no desire to impact company decisions by actively
83 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing trustee use of derivatives). Of
course, individual trusts are able to limit shorting through their governing documents.
I4 This assumes, of course, that the trust instrument has not prohibited their use. See, e.g.,
Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. N. Tr. Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d 313, 321-23 (5th
Cir. 1999) (holding trustee liable for violating trust requirements that prohibited short sales,
among other strategies).
85 12 C.F.R. § 249.10 (establishing minimum liquidity coverage ratio requirement and
mandating minimum liquidity for banks).
86 Id. § 249.20 (requiring high-quality liquid assets to meet liquidity requirement).
87 See, e.g., Pahnitter, supra note 58, at 277-78 (finding, before passage of new liquidity
coverage ratio rules, commercial banks invested 0.4% of their assets in equities, savings
associations invested 1.4%, and broker-dealers invested 7.3%).
88 See, e.g., CuRTo, supra note 26, at 1 (estimating sovereign wealth funds assets total
between $13.4 and $17.5 trillion).
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using their voting rights. ' 89 However, some evidence suggests that these funds
are now taking on greater risks. For example, the Saudi Arabia's Public
Investment Fund invested forty-five billion dollars in the SoftBank Vision
Fund;9° this fund was dedicated to taking risk in the technology sector, but the
positions have been long positions in private companies, not short positions.
Although systematic information about sovereign wealth funds generally is
not available, Norway's transparent sovereign wealth fund provides perhaps the
most comprehensive examination into a sovereign wealth fund's holdings.
Norway's fund is currently the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world,
managing just over one trillion dollars.91 It invests mainly in publicly traded
equity, fixed income securities, and a 2.7% holding of unlisted real estate.92 The
Norwegian government provides the fund with a 70% equity/30% fixed income
target allocation, with the equity and fixed income portions individually
benchmarked to global indexes.93 The fund also faces tracking error limitations,
with the expectation that it will be within 1.25 percentage points of benchmark
indices in at least two out of three years. 94
Although the government does not expressly limit shorting by the fund, and
the fund does not appear to have explicit limits on short selling, some of the
investment restrictions suggest that short selling is either limited or non-existent.
For example, the fund guidelines state that a maximum of 5% of the equity and
fixed-income investments can be leveraged; in fact the fund reports that only 1%
is leveraged.95 Moreover, a maximum of 5% of the fund's value can be
represented by borrowed securities; the fund reports only 1.4%.96 Finally, a
maximum of 1.5% of the fund can be invested in any single company (which
limits the potential returns from shorting that we discuss later); the fund reports
a maximum investment of only 1%.97
89 INT'L MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDs-A WORK AGENDA 9 (2008),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/3 1/Sovereign-Wealth-
Funds-A-Work-Agenda-PP4234 [https://perma.cc/XC6Z-RKA2].
90 Farrell, supra note 18.
91 Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, supra note 26 (showing Norway's sovereign wealth
fund manages $1,074,600,000).
92 NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., GOVERNMENT GLOBAL PENSION FuNDS: QUARTERLY
REPORT Q3 2018, at 4 (2018), https://www.nbim.no/contentassets/6ca8926d402d484b85569a
ddb7697992/gpfg-3q-2018-quarterly-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6EV-6GEL] (detailing
investment strategy of fund).
93 Year-to-Date, NORGES BANK INV. MGMT. (Aug. 21, 2018), [https://perma.cc/7X5M-
3C46] (detailing benchmark strategy).
94 Risk Management, NORGEs BANK INV. MGMT., https://www.nbim.no/en/investments/in
vestment-risk/ [https://perma.cc/6ZC5-KMW7] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) ("The expected
tracking error limit is 125 basis points, or 1.25 percentage point.").
95 Id. (limiting leveraged investments to 5%).
96 Id. (limiting borrowing to 5% of the fund).
97 Id. (limiting investment in one company to 1.5% of fund).
2019]
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The fund is subject to government-imposed ethical exclusions, with which it
appears to comply by not purchasing shares of certain companies, instead of
employing short selling. For example, the fund is prohibited from investing in
tobacco or certain weapons manufacturers, companies with a risk of violating
"fundamental ethical norms," companies whose activities lead to greenhouse gas
emissions, and mining or power companies with high involvement in the coal
industry. 98 According to one estimate, these exclusions have cost the fund 0.06
percentage points of return over the last twelve years on an annualized basis.99
Norway's sovereign wealth fund has taken at least one substantial and
controversial short position, though this position was in the bond market, not the
stock market. In 2008, the fund reportedly invested hundreds of millions of
dollars "to undermine Iceland's economy" by shorting bonds of nearby Iceland's
banks. 1°° The fund apparently believed the banks were about to experience
financial hardship from a regional economic downturn.10 1 After Iceland publicly
voiced its displeasure, the fund abandoned the position; it is not clear what
financial return the fund received from the position.10 2
Despite the potential political backlash, sovereign wealth funds may be well
positioned to engage in short selling. The funds seem to face few restrictions on
their investing strategies. Most funds are charged with the general requirement
that they maximize financial returns for long-term policies, 10 3 and most funds
are under no obligation to disclose publicly their short positions, which might
generate wrath from short targets. Funds may face individualized investment
limitations (such as Norway's), but evidence on them is scant. Sovereign wealth
funds generally do not publicize their positions, so it is possible that these funds
have significant undisclosed short positions, or might establish such positions in
the future.
98 NORGES BANK INv. MGMT., RETURN AND RISK: GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL
16 (2017), https://www.nbim.no/contentassets/db0b28dcl 3934aa6a56596d81 d47a33a/return
-and-risk-2017---govemnent-pension-fund-global.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCU7-XYA7]
(discussing fund's prohibition on investing in specific products and companies where there
are "violations of fundamental ethical norms").
99 Id. (estimating loss accrued due to ethical exclusions).
100 Asset-Backed Insecurity - Sovereign-Wealth Funds, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, at 79
(discussing controversial shorting of Icelandic bonds by Norwegian fund).
101 Id. (noting Norway likely made decision to short Icelandic bonds because it sensed
market boom was near the end).
102 Id.
103 See, e.g., Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, The Investment Strategies
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 27 J. ECON. PERsp. 219, 220 (2013) (noting funds normally seek
to maximize long-term benefits). The authors discuss how funds can diverge from this goal,
particularly when facing direct involvement by domestic politicians who may favor short-
term economic boosts at the expense of long-term returns. See id. at 231 ("[O]ur results lend
support to the hypothesis that funds exposed to political influences show major deviations
from long-run return maximization.").
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F. Endowments
Nonprofit endowments invest funds to further the nonprofit's mission.
University endowments are perhaps the most familiar type of endowment. There
are, however, other categories of institutions that also have endowments,
including in healthcare, the arts, and other nonprofit industries.
States generally place few restrictions on endowment investment, allowing
the individual endowment to impose any desired restrictions. This approach
leaves endowments with significant flexibility to achieve their objectives, which
they often utilize to invest in nontraditional ways.
Some endowments have used this flexibility to bet against stocks. For
example, Harvard University's endowment, the largest endowment in the
country at thirty-seven billion dollars, 1° 4 has regularly purchased put options that
pay off when security prices decrease. 10 5 The endowment also holds a sizable
portion of its investments in an "absolute return" strategy (14% in 2016).106
Although the composition of absolute return position is not disclosed, absolute
return investing often uses short and derivative positions to make money
independent of market movements.
Like sovereign wealth funds and pension funds, endowments occasionally
face self-imposed restrictions on investing in certain industries or classes of
companies. Harvard's endowment, for example, does not hold shares in tobacco
companies or in companies involved in certain human rights violations. 10 7
In all states except Pennsylvania, endowments are also subject to the Uniform
Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (the "UPMIFA"). 1°8 The
UPMIFA applies to restricted gifts and is designed to limit the spend down of
these gifts. 109 Thirteen states have adopted language stating that if an endowment
104 Harvard at a Glance, HARv. UNIV., https://www.harvard.edu/about-harvard/harvard-
glance [https://perma.cc/N7J6-BEUP] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) (noting endowment for
fiscal year 2017 was $37.1 billion).
105 For instance, its Form 13F for the first quarter of 2016 shows eleven put positions
encompassing bets against individual companies and broad U.S. stock market indices. Harv.
Mgmt. Co., Information Table (Form 13F) (May 13, 2016) (detailing investments by Harvard
endowment in first quarter of 2016).
106 HARv. MGMT. Co., ANNUAL ENDOWMENT REPORT 2 (2016), http://www.hmc.harvard.e
du/content/uploads/2019/03/FY16_HMC_AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7PH-A94
5] (detailing strategic asset allocation of endowment).
107 Investment for the Long-Term, HARV. MGMT. CO., http://www.hmc.harvard.edulinvest
ment-management/sustainableinvestment.html [https://perma.cc/3THD-YC5K] (last visited
Apr. 16, 2019) ("[T]he University recognizes that very rare occasions may arise when
companies' activities are so deeply repugnant and ethically unjustifiable as to warrant the
University's institutional dissociation from those activities.").
10S BARBARA RHOMBERG, KAVANAUGH RHOMBERG LLP, ENDOWMENT LAW 2 (2017),
https://www.krnonprofitlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/1 1/Law-of-Endowments-State-
Bar-NPO-Cte-9.14.17-00016736xE48C5.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V7T-PBKR].
109 See, e.g., Brian Galle, Why Do Foundations Follow the Law? Evidence from Adoption
of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 36 J. POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT.
532, 536 (2017).
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spends down greater than 7%, that expenditure will face a rebuttable
presumption of imprudence; 110 the remaining states have a balancing test for
making this determination."1 The UPMIFA, however, does not restrict
investment in any particular type of security, stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law other than this [Act], an institution may invest in any kind of
property or type of investment."'1 12 To that end, nonprofit endowments face
similar prudent investor standards as do pension plans and trustees. Investment
decisions under this statutory regime are evaluated through a reasonably prudent
investor lens, based on the portfolio as a whole.'1 3 It is unclear whether short
positions violate this standard. As long as an endowment has short positions that
are not very large or focused, they should be permissible under the JPMIFA.
G. Foundations
Private foundations consist of pools of money designed to achieve defined
charitable purposes. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, for example,
applies its approximately fifty-two billion dollars in assets to reducing global
human inequality.1 14 Private foundations have several relevant restrictions
imposed by the IRS if they wish to have tax-advantaged treatment. First, they
are required to distribute their annual income to charitable organizations or face
a 30% tax.115 Second, they are prohibited from holding more than a 20% share
of any business, or else they must pay a 10% penalty on the excess holding.116
The IRS imposes no other relevant restrictions on private foundation
investments, and there are no specific rules regarding the use of short positions.
Foundations will, however, be governed by the UPIA (if structured as a trust) or
the UPMIFA (if structured as a nonprofit organization). As discussed above,
neither of these Acts appears to prohibit the use of any particular investment
110 ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, UPMIFA AND UMIFA ENACTMENT 1-2 (2009), https://files.ar
noldporter.com/upmifa%20chart /o20(nov.%206,%202009).pdf [https://perma.cc/P7TV-1-IF
N6] (identifying thirteen states with rebuttable presumption of imprudence for expenditures
greater than 7% in year); Galle, supra note 109, at 536 ("More than a dozen states enacted
this provision."). This includes Ohio's provision that expenditures below 5% are
presumptively prudent. Oujo REv. CODE ANN. § 1715.53 (West 2018).
111 ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 110, at 1-2 (noting states that lack rebuttable
presumption of imprudence).
112 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDs ACT § 3(e)(3) (NAT'L CONF. OF
CoMM'Rs ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006).
13 Id. at § 3(b) ("[E]ach person responsible for managing and investing an institutional
fund shall manage and invest the fund in good faith and with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.").
114 Who We Are: Financials, BIL & MELINDA GATEs FOUND., https://www.gatesfoundatio
n.org/Who-We-Are/General-Information/Financials [https://perma.cc/C3RT-KTJS] (last
visited Apr. 16, 2019) ("The foundation works to reduce inequities around the world."
(emphasis omitted)). This number includes the Foundation's beneficial interest in related trust
assets.
115 26 U.S.C. § 4942(a) (2012).
116 Id. § 4943(a)(1), (c).
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security, instead requiring an assessment of whether the portfolio as a whole
conforms to reasonably prudent investor choices. 117 While individual
foundations might impose restrictions on their own investments, there do not
appear to be any general regulatory roadblocks against foundation shorting.
II. SHORT ADVANTAGES
Before we consider whether and how institutional investors could become
more involved in short selling, we first turn to an analysis of the potential
advantages of such increased involvement.
A. More Accurate Securities Prices
Maintaining accurate securities prices is desirable for several reasons. The
price of a security can be a useful signal to identify the extent to which firms can
generate value from investment.1 18 If a firm's securities carry a price that is too
high relative to the firm's ability to produce, that firm will attract more capital
than it otherwise should; if the price is too low, the firm will receive too little.' 19
Accurate pricing of securities contributes to the more efficient allocation of
capital. 120
Under most models of securities pricing, securities prices are based on the
information available in securities marketplaces. Having accurate available
information is therefore critical to having accurate securities prices. Companies
already have incentives to publicize positive information about their operations.
Positive information keeps share prices high, painting management in a positive
light, making it easier for the company to raise future funds, and increasing
executive compensation that depends on performance measured by securities
prices. 12 1
The incentive to release negative information is markedly less. Although
public companies must disclose certain (positive or negative) information
pursuant to mandatory periodic disclosure rules, these disclosure categories
cover only certain enumerated-types of information. The same forces that push
voluntary disclosure of additional positive information also otherwise dissuade
voluntary disclosure of additional negative information.
117 See supra Sections ID, I.F (discussing UPIA and UPMIFA requirements of conformity
to reasonably prudent investor choices).
118 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1005-08 (1992) (noting "accurate stock prices further efficient
allocation of capital").
119 Id. at 1006 (discussing how discrepant stock prices result in inefficient investments).
120 Id. ("When stock prices are accurate, new investors pay for newly issued shares exactly
what they are worth.").
121 Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix & Dirk Jenter, Executive Compensation: A Survey of
Theory and Evidence 151 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 6585, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/s
ol3/papers.cfhi?abstract-id=2992287 (identifying use of management performance-based
pay).
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The disclosure of negative information, therefore, is particularly useful and
important. But since releasing negative information tends to decrease associated
securities prices, long-only investors may not have enough financial incentive
to invest in discovering and disclosing this information.
There are two ways for long investors to benefit from disclosing negative
information. One would be to sell or underweight the affected security before
the information otherwise gets out, avoiding losses. By trimming overpriced
securities from their long portfolios, the long investor sends a signal through her
sale that the shares are overpriced; this signal might eventually be incorporated
into the security price. But the prospect of selling shares to avoid losses does not
necessarily give institutional investors sufficient returns to warrant devoting
resources to discovering and disclosing negative information, since her potential
returns are capped by the amount of overpriced stock holdings.
Consider, for instance, an institutional investor with a diversified portfolio of
one hundred equally weighted stocks. Each stock constitutes only 1% of the
overall portfolio's value. If the institutional investor believes one stock is
overvalued by 10%, the maximum returns from completely liquidating her
position and avoiding the later loss from the security's correction are only 0.1%
of the portfolio value. As the portfolio becomes more diversified, the potential
returns to discovering and disclosing negative information about small holdings
becomes proportionately lower.122 Long-only portfolios therefore might not
fully reveal negative information they have already acquired as a byproduct of
other research; underweighting those securities will only partially capitalize the
information into stock prices, and the costs of negative disclosure can prevent
the fund from otherwise revealing its information. 123
On the other hand, if the fund believes the stock is undervalued, it can use its
long holding strategy to buy more of the undervalued shares, yielding returns
constrained only by the assets of the fund (and any restrictions on investment
concentration). Long investors therefore have disparate incentives to discover
and disclose positive, not negative, information.
Another way for long investors to benefit from disclosing negative
information would be to buy shares in other securities that are expected to rise
with the negative information. This method offers long investors the potential
for greater gains, since their capacity to buy other shares is less limited than their
capacity to sell. On the other hand, this method comes with greater potential risk.
122 For example, Vanguard's Total Stock Market Index Fund held 3,615 stocks as of April
16, 2019. Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund Investor Shares, VANGUARD, https://inves
tor.vanguard.com/mutual-ftmds/profile/portfolio/vtsmx [https://perma.cc/EBE7-PMCT] (last
visited Apr. 16, 2019). If these holdings were equally weighted, each stock would comprise
only 0.027% of the overall portfolio. Because the holdings are not equally weighted, several
of them will represent a far lower percentage of the overall portfolio.
123 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (highlighting adverse consequences that may
result from negative disclosure). For this reason in particular, we recommend that investment
funds have at least one long-short fund in its family to act upon negative information
uncovered by analysts during their long-only research.
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The fund must not only be able to predict that its negative information will be
viewed as material in the marketplace, but it must also be able to predict which
alternative securities will rise as a result of the information's release.
For example, if the fund knows that a popular restaurant chain is suffering
from an undisclosed E. coli outbreak, the fund might reasonably think this news
will negatively impact the chain's stock price. Perhaps that means the shares of
competing chains will rise, as traffic is driven to these competitors. On the other
hand, competitors' share prices could instead decline, due to broader fears about
food safety and concerns about reductions in restaurant patronage more
generally.
For long-only investors, the rewards from uncovering negative information
are lower and the costs of disclosing it are higher relative to positive information.
Assuming that information is distributed across both positive and negative types,
we can expect comparatively less negative information to enter the securities
marketplace than positive information, even before taking into account firms'
disproportionate incentive to disclose positive information. The result is a biased
picture of firms' operations, leading to an inefficient allocation of capital.
If investors engaged in shorting, however, this picture can begin to be
corrected by making the rewards from acting on negative information
comparatively larger. By shorting the affected security, investors can profit
directly from discovering and releasing negative information, without being
constrained by the size of a long holding or the need to find a negatively
correlated competitor stock. Indeed, this is an effective strategy employed by
many hedge funds.124
The optimal result would be where there is sufficient short selling to lead to
both positive and negative information being reflected in stock prices. Our claim
is that the various restrictions of short selling lead to an inefficient informational
bias. Under these conditions markets would still be biased towards positive
information because companies would voluntarily disclose disproportionately
positive information about themselves, investors would continue to face
comparatively high regulatory and legal costs from disclosing negative
information, and shorting would therefore be a comparatively expensive form of
investment. 125 But the problem would be less severe. As the rewards to
uncovering and disclosing negative information increase, more negative
information should be uncovered and capitalized into securities prices, leading
to more efficient securities prices as a result. 126
124 For empirical analysis of this phenomenon, see generally Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra
note 36.
125 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text (noting structural phenomena that cause
markets to bias positive information over negative information).
126 See Vivian W. Fang, Allen H. Huang & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Short Selling and
Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment, 71 J. FIN. 1251, 1254 (2016) (finding short
selling to improve asset pricing efficiency).
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B. Greater Management Discipline
As mentioned above, firm management has incentives to release
disproportionately positive information about company operations. If negative
information is not discovered and released, another problem unfolds in addition
to inefficiently priced securities: management may lack the incentive to perform
its job with diligence. The separation of ownership and control in large firms
leaves management often with no effective monitor, generating the agency costs
familiar in corporate law. 127
Since shorting increases the financial returns from discovering negative
information, its presence also increases the likelihood of discovering
management's misbehavior. Short selling could lead to relatively quick
corrections, and the enhanced threat from short sellers could deter managers and
reduce agency costs.128 Professors Fang, Huang, and Karpoff find empirical
support for precisely this hypothesis: the threat and presence of short selling
reduces management's manipulation of earnings numbers and fraudulent
conduct. 129
Thus, short selling can help mitigate the fundamental agency cost problem of
corporations. An optimal amount of shorting, including shorting by institutional
investors, could help minimize agency costs, both by increasing the discovery
of management misdeeds and by increasing the threat that any potential other
misdeeds will be discovered and corrected.
C. Address Shorting and Lending Problems
The daisy chain of share lending continues to generate difficulties.1 30 The
initial problems arose from the fact that a holder of shares that (unknowingly to
her) have been loaned out to a shorter, and the later purchaser of those lent
shares, cannot both have voting rights; each share is to have a single vote, not
two or more. In some instances, the number of shorted shares has even exceeded
the number of outstanding shares. 131 Share lending creates the illusion that there
are more shares beneficially owned than actually registered.
127 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & EcON. 301, 304-05 (1983) (discussing how separation of management from control
creates agency costs).
128 Massimo Massa, Bohui Zhang & Hong Zhang, The Invisible Hand of Short Selling:
Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?, 28 REv. FIN. STUD. 1701, 1702-03
(2015) (detailing how short selling can discipline management).
129 Fang, Huang & Karpoff, supra note 126, at 1287 (finding short selling "curbs
managers' willingness to manipulate earnings").
130 Legal scholars have discussed these problems for more than a decade. See, e.g., Kahan
& Rock, supra note 19, at 1257 (discussing impact of securities lending); Martin & Partnoy,
supra note 19, at 780 (discussing issues that arise due to share lending).
131 See, e.g., Ganesh, LLC v. Comput. Learning Ctrs., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 487,491 (E.D. Va.
1998) (noting that the six million shares of Computer Learning Centers sold short exceeded
the company's actual float).
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At first blush, it might appear that increasing the amount of short selling by
encouraging institutional investors to engage in more shorting would exacerbate
problems associated with share lending. However, there are reasons to believe
the opposite would be true. Although short interest overall would increase, and
a greater percentage of shares of companies would be shorted, the additional
liquidity associated with greater shorting could help prevent certain difficulties,
including short squeezes. Moreover, if institutional investors were more
involved in short selling, they naturally would apply pressure to rationalize
various aspects of the share lending market, such as double voting from lent
shares.
In contrast, today institutional investors benefit from many of the
dysfunctional aspects of short selling. Institutional investors earn significant fee
income from lending shares. In some instances, this income is the main way for
these institutional investors to demonstrate good performance, or be able to
track, and not underperform, a benchmark index.
However, the fact that these institutional investors also face pressures to call
back their shares during certain important events, such as voting in proxy fights,
leads to imbalances in the markets. If institutional investors were not only share
lenders, but also short sellers, they naturally would counterbalance the pressure
for shares to be recalled at certain times.
Perhaps most important, if institutional investors were significant participants
in short selling, there might be more pressure from important constituencies,
such as the Council of Institutional Investors, to reform various aspects of share
lending practices. Institutional investors would be more likely to explore
alternatives to share lending, methodologies for broker determinations of how
to allocate share rights, and the use of blockchain technologies for tracking
individual shares as they are loaned out. The involvement of institutional
investors likely could shift the debate from one driven by a handful of short
sellers to one driven by mainstream institutional investors.
D. Voting, Taxation of Dividends, and Bankruptcy
To the extent institutions become more involved in short selling, they likely
would encounter challenges related to the distribution of shareholder rights. The
most straightforward challenge is voting. There, as noted above, more than one
"shareholder" can believe they are entitled to vote, but only the final purchaser
of loaned out shares actually has that right.1 32
Similar difficulties arise with respect to dividends. Corporations pay a
dividend only once per share. When shares are loaned out, more than one person
purchases the share, which means more than one dividend must be paid. The last
132 See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 19, at 798 n. 108 ("SEC and NYSE rules provide that
one may vote only shares in one's 'possession and control."'); see also Commodity and
Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2018) (requiring broker or dealer to maintain
possession or control over all securities carried for customers); N.Y. STOCK ExCH. RULES, R.
452 (2003) (detailing who is eligible to vote stock).
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purchaser of a loaned share is the only person with the right to receive a dividend
from the corporation. The other, earlier purchasers have the right to receive
payments equal to the dividend amount from the short seller. Those dividends
can be taxed differently, as they are not dividends from the company in the
traditional sense, leading to suboptimal results, high transaction costs, and
potentially fairness concerns.
Similar problems arise in bankruptcy, though those challenges are limited by
the fact that equity interests typically receive little or nothing in a bankruptcy
distribution. In a settlement or other proceeding, only the final purchaser of a
share has the right to receive a distribution from the debtor estate. Earlier
purchasers must look to the anonymous short seller for any payment.
Likewise, in a shareholder litigation settlement or judgment, only the final
purchaser of loaned shares should legally be entitled to any distribution from a
settlement or common fund. Yet the required proof of class membership
typically does not involve proof related to share lending; instead, one need only
prove that shares were purchased.
Greater involvement of institutional investors in short selling would alert a
wider swath of the financial community to these challenges, creating greater
pressure for both private ordering and regulatory solutions. Instead, any pressure
for reform now comes from a small minority of the investing community.
We pause to note briefly the impact of shorting for one proposed reform in
this area: blockchain technology in the financial markets. 133 As noted above,
shareholders often need to show they qualify for fundamental legal rights as
holders of shares. These include not only voting and litigation, but appraisal,
books and records requests, proxy fights, and shareholder proposals. Blockchain
reforms have the potential to help clarify who is entitled to exercise shareholder
rights, but when we consider the impact of shorting (whether institutional or
otherwise), the use of blockchain also raises further complications, such as
whether the holder of the equity claim holds a claim against the corporation or
against some amorphous group of lenders and short sellers.
For example, it remains unclear whether blockchain technology would
streamline voting. Instead, voting might become more complex due to the share
recalls that inevitably would occur before votes if shareholders were aware of a
distributed ledger and behaved rationally. Imagine that a single share has been
loaned out ten times, and then a vote is announced. Any one of the ten purchasers
at any point could call that specific share, leading to the unwinding of all of the
short positions (or at least a need to replace that share with a different loaned
share). In such instances, tracing through blockchain could create problems that
previously were masked by the treatment of shares as fungible.
Likewise, the use of blockchain technology likely would pose challenges
related to dividends and other rights. Some shareholder rights require individual
share-level identification, even if it would be very costly or difficult to pinpoint
133 See George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 Nw. U. L. REv. 227,
256-57 (2018) (discussing emergence of blockchain technology).
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the actual share, while other rights arguably require only category-level
identification. Given the speed of trading, and amount of high-frequency trading,
it might be difficult for even the most sophisticated blockchain technology to
keep up with rapidly changing distributed ledgers. If there is uncertainty in the
recordation process, so that particular details do not show up instantaneously in
the blockchain, the ledger might inevitably be slightly behind (indeed, some
automated trading systems might have incentives to try to take advantage of this
slight delay). It might be that an instant auction system would work better than
a distributed ledger, collecting all buy and sell orders and then matching and
clearing them in an auction, perhaps a few times per day.
Of course, a distributed blockchain ledger would let a shareholder figure out
who the downstream owner of each share is as of a particular time, but it could
be difficult and costly, if not impossible, for the owner to call back that specific
share. Overall, short selling and share lending creates problems for blockchain
technology, even if it is possible to trace shares accurately and efficiently.
Institutional investors that were involved in both share lending and short selling
would have a greater stake in determining optimal policy choices in response to
these challenges.
E. Engagement with Public Policy
From time to time, institutional investors find it in their constituents' interest
(or, in the case of certain public pension funds, are required by the state) to
engage in public policy matters. One familiar example of this engagement has
been university endowments' refusal to invest in tobacco companies or certain
other industries they find to be objectionable. 134 Public pension funds, notably
including the California Public Employees' Retirement System ("CalPERS"),
also have pursued this strategy.
Sovereign wealth funds also sometimes pursue public policy goals as part of
their investment decisions. For instance, based on its belief that Wal-Mart was
using child labor, Norway's sovereign wealth fund sold its $400 million stake in
Wal-Mart stock; it also later sold its $450 million stake in Duke Energy because
of criticisms of Duke Energy's environmental record.135
Even private foundations and insurance companies occasionally divest
investments from companies they deem objectionable. For example, the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, a private foundation helping to improve humanity,
134 See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on certain
investments, including tobacco and other "ethically unjustifiable" companies, for Harvard
University's endowment).
135 Kjetil Malkenes Hovland, Norway's Sovereign- Wealth Fund to No Longer Invest in
Duke Energy, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 7,2016, 2:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/norwa
y-sovereign-wealth-fund-to-no-longer-invest-in-duke-energy- 1473271601 ?ns=prod/account
s-wsj (discussing Norway's divestment from Wal-Mart and Duke Energy); Mark Landler,
Norway Backs Its Ethics with Its Cash, N.Y. TIMs, May 4,2007, at C1 (discussing Norway's
movement toward ethical investment choices, which includes scrutiny of companies with
human rights violations like Wal-Mart).
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divested its one-billion-dollar endowment almost entirely from fossil fuels, and
completely from companies involved in coal and tar sands.136 Allianz, a
prominent global insurer, announced it would stop selling insurance policies to
coal companies in an attempt to reduce global use of fossil fuels. 137 Lloyd's of
London divested coal companies from its investments. 138 AXA determined it
would discontinue insuring, and divest $800 million in investments from,
companies and oil pipelines related to the North American tar sands
development. 139
Finally, some investment funds have been built entirely around the idea of
engaging in public policy. Socially responsible investment funds, for example,
target companies and industries they perceive as furthering various social
policies such as environmental responsibility or employee relations. 140
To date, institutional investors' engagement with public policy occurs almost
exclusively through a refusal to buy certain companies they find objectionable,
or through the sale of existing holdings in those companies. In other words, they
engage with public policy through their use or withholding of long positions.
Short selling offers an opportunity for institutional investors to take an even
stronger position against certain companies or industries. Instead of passively
refusing to buy, or reducing a long position, institutional investors could sell
shares they do not yet own, signaling even greater displeasure than is possible
with long interests alone. Moreover, to the extent public policy engagement
matches up with future economic activity, shorting allows institutional investors
the means to profit off public policy positions, perhaps increasing their
engagement in these important matters.
136 Fossil Fuel Divestment, ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND, https://www.rbf.org/mission-
aligned-investing/divestment [https://perma.cc/AE6E-9ELU] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019)
("We committed to reducing our exposure to coal and tar sands-two of the most intensive
source of carbon emissions-to less than one percent of the total portfolio by the end of
[2005].").
137 Riham Alkousaa, Allianz Cuts Back on Coal Insurance After Environmentalism
Criticism, REUTERS (May 4, 2018, 6:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allianz-
climatechange/allianz-cuts-back-on-coal-insurance-after-environmentalist-criticism-
idUSKBN11511D [https://perma.cc/MD35-B6T9] ("Germany's Allianz will immediately
stop insuring single coal-fired power plants and coal mines ....").
138 Julia Kollewe, Lloyd's of London to Divest from Coal Over Climate Change,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2018, 10:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/an/21/
lloyds-of-london-to-divest-from-coal-over-climate-change [https://perma.cc/WU5U-8LAW]
("Lloyd's will start to exclude coal from its investment strategy from 1 April.").
131 Press Release, AXA, AXA Accelerates Its Commitment to Fight Climate Change (Dec.
12, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://group.axa.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/axa-accelerates-its-
commitment-to-fight-climate-change [https://perma.cc/J7LM-CX7L] (announcing
divestments decisions designed to fight climate change).
140 See, e.g., CHARLES SCHWAB, SOCIALLY CONSCIOUS FUNDS LIST 1 (2018), https://www.s
chwab.com/public/file/P-9561751/ [https://perma.cc/T96P-PVPF] ("A socially conscious
fund may take a proactive stance by selectively investing in, for example, environmentally
friendly companies or firms with good employee relations.").
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For example, if coal companies were to become less valuable over time
(perhaps in part due to institutional investors' attempts to manage greenhouse
gas emissions), shorting those companies today offers the prospect of financial
returns from policy engagement. Current strategies of divesting holdings merely
offer the prospect of avoiding future losses. Or, a socially responsible investment
fund that sought to double down on its mission might not merely buy socially
responsible companies, but also short "vice" companies to amplify its socially
responsible stake.
Whether more public policy engagement by institutional investors is
normatively desirable is an issue that is largely outside the scope of this Article.
To the extent institutional investors' policy goals diverge from those of the
public at large, there could be major costs from policy engagement. 41
Institutional investors might press for policy changes that benefit their short
positions, at the expense of society overall. 142 However, in the current
environment of increasing interest in stakeholder representation, one could
certainly make a case for increasing this engagement.
III. INCREASING INSTITUTIONAL SHORTING
Given the potential advantages of increased institutional short selling, we
conclude by considering ways institutions might go about increasing their
shorting activity. Given the difficulties-and perhaps undesirability-of
attempting wholesale regulatory change, we consider exclusively the domain of
working within existing regulatory constraints. Our possibilities can be divided
into two general categories: indirect participation in shorting and direct
participation in. shorting.
A. Indirect Participation
Perhaps the easiest way for institutional investors to increase their shorting
activity would be through indirect participation: investing in entities that in turn
engage in short selling. Institutions might, for example, invest in a hedge fund
that regularly engages in active shorting campaigns.
To some extent, limited indirect participation is already occurring. It is not
unusual for university endowments to hold some positions in hedge funds and
other entities that engage in shorting. 143 Sovereign wealth funds also on occasion
141 See, e.g., Memorandum from FTI Consulting to Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. (May
23, 2016), [https://perma.cc/X9JA-8J9E] (reporting survey results, sponsored by oil and gas
trade association, identifying divergence between pension and pensioner opinions regarding
divestment from oil and gas companies).
142 For charitable organizations like foundations and public charities with endowments,
some of this concern might already be mitigated through prohibitions against political
activities and lobbying.
143 Harvard's endowment, for example, invests 14% of its endowment in an absolute return
'strategy, mimicking hedge fund investments. HARV. MGMT. Co., supra note 106, at 2 (noting
14% of assets invested in "absolute return"). Yale's endowment has a 25% targeted allocation
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hold similar interests.144 Actively managed mutual funds may deploy shorting
in their overall money-making endeavors; some mutual funds engage almost
exclusively in shorting. 145
As discussed in Part I, apart from banks and insurance companies, there do
not appear to be regulatory impediments to indirect shorting. Moreover, even
banks and insurance companies potentially could engage in some indirect
shorting. For example, insurance companies are permitted to invest 20-25% of
their capital in equity securities; 146 at least some of those amounts could be
invested in entities that short. Overall, indirect shorting appears to be feasible
for most institutional investors, even without regulatory change.147
Indirect participation offers some of the advantages discussed in Part II. By
investing in other short-sellers, institutions would be indirectly increasing the
presence of short selling activity, potentially leading to more accurate securities
prices and greater managerial discipline while increasing the pressure to reform
shorting's lending practices. The increased short selling would occur even if
these institutional investors did not have direct control over the short selling.
Nevertheless, indirect participation offers less flexibility to use shorting to
engage with public policy concerns. Because institutions themselves would not
have the short positions, they would be dependent on the short-sellers that they
invest in to achieve any desired policy goals. Conceivably, if there were enough
appetite for the specialized short-sellers, short-sellers might emerge to
accommodate demand for various policy campaigns. The emergence of various
socially responsible investment funds speaks to this potential. As of yet,
however, such shorting specialists do not appear to exist in significant size,
making this a sacrifice institutional investors will have to bear in exchange for
only indirect participation in shorting.
to these investments. YALE INVS. OFFICE, THE YALE ENDOWMENT 12 (2017), http://invest
ments.yale.edu/s/YaleEndowment-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN4W-SA9Y] ("Today, the
absolute return portfolio is targeted to be 25.0% of the Endowment ... ").
1" For instance, Singapore's sovereign wealth fund has been reported to invest 25% of its
assets in shorting hedge funds. CURTO, supra note 26, at 3 (noting "a quarter of Singapore's
SWF is believed to be" invested through hedge funds that short).
145 These funds are generally referred to as bear market funds, as they aim to make money
when overall markets decline. For example, the Grizzly Short Fund, with $100 million in
assets under management, aims to have all its assets invested in shorting individual stocks.
LEUTHOLD FuNDs, GRIZZLY SHORT FuND 1 (2015), (noting fund "endeavors to remain 100%
short individual stocks at all times").
146 State risk-based capital requirements might result in insurers' having to adjust this
percentage downward to satisfy solvency requirements, depending on the insurer's overall
mix of assets.
147 Of course, if the institution's governing documents restrict the institution's ability to
invest in shorting entities, these documents would have to be amended, or else the individual
institution could not participate. But this presents only individualized issues unique to
individual institutional investors, rather than a systemic problem shared across institutional
investors.
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B. Direct Participation
In addition to indirect participation, institutional investors could directly
engage in more short selling. The easiest way to do so would, of course, be to
take direct short positions in companies. As discussed in Part I, many
institutional investors face no barriers to direct engagement in shorting. Other
institutional investors, such as insurance companies and banks, face clear
regulatory prohibitions against uncovered shorting and will not have this option
available.
Some institutional investors fall between these two poles. One group includes
pension plans, trustees, and foundations, which are governed by prudent investor
standards. As discussed above, this open-ended standard does not appear to
preclude direct engagement in shorting. 148 At the same time, direct shorting has
not explicitly been determined to fall within a prudent investor's portfolio. Given
the negative ramifications of being held to have violated this standard, these
institutional investors understandably might shy away from significant direct
shorting. To resolve the uncertainty and potentially encourage these institutional
investors' participation, we recommend that courts or legislatures clearly
determine (one way or another) whether shorting could fit within a prudent
investor's activities.
Another group of institutional investors that fall into a middle area between
clear prohibitions and clear direct engagement are institutional investors who
seek to track a relevant index. Mutual funds present an obvious example, but
many other types of institutional investors also have adopted strategies requiring
them to mimic relevant benchmark indices. Norway's sovereign wealth fund is
mandated to track an equity index published by FTSE and a bond index
published by Barclays, 149 and endowments may have to benchmark their
performance against various indexes. 150 At first glance, being forced to mimic
an index's performance seemingly precludes direct shorting, unless the index
includes a short position.
Nevertheless, for these middle-pole investors, there is still significant room
for direct shorting. As a practical matter, index tracking funds typically have
some flexibility, both in the securities they hold and in how closely they track
the index. Even Vanguard, one of the leading passive mutual fund families, notes
that its index funds "seek[] to hold all, or a representative sample, of the
148 See supra Sections I.C, I.D, I.G (discussing institutional investors governed by prudent
investor standards).
149 Investment Strategy, NORGES BANK INv. MGMT., https://www.nbim.no/en/investments/
investment-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/R79S-QR93] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019) ("The
benchmark index is set by the Ministry of Finance on the basis of indices from FTSE Group
and Bloomberg Barclays Indices.").
151 See supra Section I.F (discussing investment strategy of endowments).
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securities that make up its target index." 151 Index funds can and do hold more or
fewer securities than the indices they track, which means that returns may
deviate from the index's returns, contributing to tracking error.
Tolerance for tracking error opens the possibility for index tracking
institutional investors to engage in direct shorting. If the investor wants to short
a stock while still hewing closely to a benchmark, all she needs to do is find
another stock that is highly correlated and increase her long exposure in this
other stock. To take a simplified example, suppose Stock A and Stock B, each
priced at fifty dollars per share, are perfectly correlated with one another. Amy
holds one share of A and one share of B, for a total investment of one hundred
dollars. Beatrice shorts one share of A and holds three shares of B, for a total
investment of one hundred dollars. Amy and Beatrice each have one hundred
dollar portfolios and, ignoring transaction costs, each will earn identical returns.
If the price ofA (and therefore the price of B) increases by one dollar, Amy earns
one dollar on each of her two shares, netting two dollars. Beatrice loses one
dollar on her short A position but makes three dollars on her B position, also
netting two dollars.
Of course, other than perhaps for public policy reasons, there is little reason
to construct a portfolio with two perfectly correlated stocks, and in practice
finding two perfectly correlated stocks is unlikely. However, if an index-
following institutional investor who wishes to short a stock can find another
stock that is highly but not perfectly correlated, she has a viable strategy. Let us
suppose our institutional investor wished to short McDonalds stock, perhaps
because she believes it is overvalued or she objects to the way it is being run.
Our investor could combine a short position in McDonalds with a long position
in YUM Brands; the two stocks over a recent thirty-day trading period had a
high correlation coefficient of 0.86.152 This short/long strategy will expose our
institutional investor to the profit potentials and risk factors the two companies
have in common, giving her exposure to the restaurant industry that is
reasonably close to the long positions in both companies. Any factors unique to
McDonalds would contribute to tracking error, but as long as the McDonalds
short did not comprise too large a portion of the portfolio, or as long as the
151 VANGUARD, VANGUARD 500 INDEX FUND PROSPECTUS 6 (2018), https://personal.vangu
ard.com/pub/Pdf/p04O.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X8M-BXJP] (emphasis added) (defining what
indexing entails).
152 Comparative Equity Analysis, MACROAXIS, https://www.macroaxis.com/invest/
market/YUM--compareProfile--MCD [https://perma.cc/QH5A-53WQ] (last visited Apr. 16,
2019) (comparing performance of McDonalds and YUM Brands). In many circumstances,
our investor might achieve an even higher correlation by going long in a basket of similar
stocks, such as by adding several quick serve restaurants to her portfolio in this example. In
that case, she could take an even larger short position in McDonalds before incurring
significant tracking error.
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tolerance for tracking error is high enough, the institutional investor could still
track a long equity benchmark while engaging directly in short selling.1 53
To the extent there are potential gains from short selling, institutional
investors could capture those gains by selectively adding short positions and
becoming correspondingly less diversified in their long positions. They could
select stocks they believe are overvalued, or that they would like to bet against
for some investment or social purpose, and then simultaneously sell short those
stocks and buy a corresponding amount of other stocks in their long portfolio.
For example, an investor with one billion dollars invested in five thousand stocks
might select fifty stocks in which to take a one hundred million dollar short
position, and then reallocate its investments to $1.1 billion invested in the
remaining 4,950 stocks, adopting a "110/10" position for a net long exposure of
one billion dollars. The result would be a fully invested net long position that
would have greater concentration in some companies, and negative positions in
others.
CONCLUSION
In many circumstances, institutional investors do not appear to engage
significantly in short selling despite potential gains and an absence of formal
barriers. In this Article, we have sought to demonstrate that institutional shorting
is a viable strategy, with potentially promising gains to the investors and, in
some cases, to society at large. Where it is not prohibited, we recommend that
institutional investors consider shorting as a piece of their overall investment
package, perhaps as part of a 110% long/ 10% short or similar strategy. Where
institutional shorting is prohibited, this Article recommends a careful weighing
of the policy arguments in favor of and against the prohibition and the
consideration of direct and indirect strategies that might nevertheless be possible
within the existing regulatory regime.
153 This assumes that the assets are not prohibited from being put into short positions, either
by regulation in the case of banks and insurance companies, or by self-imposed restrictions
as in the case of many index mutual funds or other types of institutional investments discussed
in Part I.
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